Erik Olin Wright (1947–2019)

Avtor: Tibor Rutar

​Včeraj je po skoraj enoletnem boju z rakom umrl slavni ameriški marksistični sociolog Erik Olin Wright. Njegovi dobri kolegi so že spisali več tragičnih in ganljivih, a obenem nenavadno navdihujočih osmrtnic, ki jih je preprosto treba prebrati. Na Twitterju njegovi nekdanji študenti s hashtagom #EOWtaughtMe prisrčno popisujejo, kaj so se naučili od tega imenitnega profesorja in kako človeško, naravnost prijateljsko se je obnašal do vseh. Še pomembneje in bolj zanimivo: Wright je cel čas, ko je bil v bolnišnici, pisal poglobljen blog, prek katerega smo lahko spremljali njegovo zdravstveno stanje, njegov način ukvarjanja s smrtnostjo in njegove razmisleke o politiki, sociologiji in življenju nasploh. Samo decembra je zapisal več deset tisoč besed.

​Wright je bil poleg svojega kolega Geralda Cohena (in denimo Roberta Brennerja) eden najbolj znanih in sposobnih predstavnikov paradigme analitičnega marksizma, v okviru katerega je predvsem raziskoval in nadgrajeval marksistično teorijo razreda. Name (in na mnoge druge) je še bolj kot s svojimi konkretnimi, vsebinskimi teorijami in tezami vplival s pristopom, ki ga je zavzel do marksizma – pristopom, ki bi ga moral imeti vsak sociolog do katerekoli znanstvene paradigme. Takole ga na značilno wrightovski način opisuje v intervjuju izpred skoraj 20 let:

I will discuss the core ideas of Analytical Marxism later in this interview. Here the important thing to stress is the extraordinarily high demands this group places on issues of intellectual rigor and clarity. Sociology (not just Marxist inspired sociology) in general is characterized by loose argumentation: concepts are often vaguely defined, little effort is made to make every step in an argument transparent, assumptions are buried and reasoning is opaque. The Analytical Marxism reference group has done more than anything else to remind me of the importance of avoiding these methodological sins. When I write the shadows of the other people in the group lurk over my shoulder and scold me when I catch myself muddling through in some difficult part of an essay.
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I generally do not believe that the best way to develop arguments and push theory forward is to engage in fine-grained debates about the interpretation of texts, however brilliant they may be, particularly texts written a century or more ago. Thus, almost none of my writing centers on Marx’s own writings. If the Marxist tradition is genuinely committed to a scientific understanding of the social conditions for radical, egalitarian social change, then it would indeed be extraordinary if the most useful things on most contemporary topics in the 21st century were written in the middle decades of the 19th century. Just as evolutionary biologists don’t bother reading Darwin’s work, except out of historical interest, eventually there will — hopefully — come a time when Marx’s writings will mainly be of interest for the history of ideas, but not for the exposition of scientific arguments.
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Full-blown “bullshit” Marxism suffers from three sins:

First, obfuscation — arguments and analyses that are obscure, confusing and vague. The bullshit artist is adept at making arguments sound profound by the deployment of fancy language and arcane jargon. Of course, serious academic works often needs to use technical terms, and to an outsider these can seem to be esoteric jargon. The issue, then, is not simply the use of jargon, but its use in ways that are resistant to clarification and definition.

Second, intellectual dishonesty — the deliberate refusal to engage in careful debate, to clarify one’s arguments in a way open to challenge, to admit where there are gaps in one’s knowledge and understanding. This is probably the most damning criterion for bullshit Marxism and brings with it a moral condemnation of bad faith. It implies that an intellectual is defending positions about which he or she has some doubts but is not sharing those doubts with others. Of course, when Marxists (or anyone else) make arguments as if they had absolute certainty about the correctness of their views and refuse to acknowledge that there could be reasonable grounds for disagreement, this could simply reflect a sincere, but dogmatic, mind set in which a person is convinced of such absolute certainty. But when such absolutism comes from a sophisticated intellectual one suspects that it involves intellectual dishonesty as well — a suppression of doubts and a false representation of one’s beliefs about a problem.

Third, Marxology — the view that a correct “reading” of Marx is equivalent to a correct understanding of the world, with the result that quoting chapter and verse from the work of Marx (and sometimes other classical Marxists, especially Lenin) is seen as providing arguments in a substantive debate. This was particularly a problem when Marxism functioned more as an official ideology of states and parties than when it functioned as a theoretical paradigm within academic work, but since academics were often also deeply committed to that ideology, academic Marxists have sometimes adopted this kind of ideological style of argumentation.

There is, of course, a risk of arrogance in levelling the accusation of “bullshit” at any specific target, particularly when the second element above is emphasized. It is pretty harsh to accuse one’s opponents of intellectual dishonesty. The important thing to remember here is that the concept does not refer to any specific substantive argument, to the content of theoretical positions, but rather to the style of argument.
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As to how one avoids this kind of “bullshit”, it is not actually all that hard. I think more than anything else it means always sharing your own doubts and reservations, making it as clear as possible what you don’t understand as well as what you do, and laying out arguments in a clear, systematic manner so that critics will know exactly where they disagree.

Iz Wrightovega intelektualnega odnosa do marksizma se imamo vsi veliko naučiti. Prav tako – in pomembneje – iz njegovega neverjetno stoičnega, treznega in, čeprav nekoliko poetičnega, vseeno trdno nemističnega in nepatetičnega odnosa do lastne smrtnosti.

So, dear friends, what we've known for a while is in fact the case.  I have a very limited time left in this marvelous form of stardust which I've been talking about over the past few months. I don't feel any dread.  I want to assure you that I don't feel fear about this.  It seems very petty to complain about the eventual dissipation of my stardust back into the stardust of the cosmos after having lived 72 years in this extraordinary form of existence that very few molecules in the entire universe get to experience. 
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That's all I really am is stuff.  But stuff so complexly organized across several thresholds of stuff-complexity, that it's able to reflect upon its stuff-ness and what an extraordinary thing it has been to be alive and aware that it's alive and aware that it's aware that it's alive. And from that complexity comes the love and beauty and meaning that constitutes the life I've lived. …
​So there you have it.  I am among the most advantaged, privileged, call it what you will, stardust in this immensely enormous universe for 72 years.  And so it will end.  But I knew that, at least from age 6.  This is a few years earlier than I'd hoped, but no complaints.  No complaints.